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AL SHIMARI V. CACI INTERNATIONAL, INC.:
THE APPLICATION OF
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN
THE WAKE OF KIOBEL
Ellen Katuska*
INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 2013, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia decided Al Shimari v. CACI
International, Inc.,1 a case in which four Iraqi citizens, via the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS), brought claims in common law and international
law alleging that CACI Premier Technology, Inc. (CACI PT), “a
United States military government contractor, abused and tortured
them during their detention in Abu Ghraib, Iraq.” 2 The plaintiffs
attempted to impose liability in common law tort and under
customary international law.3 Pursuant to the United States Supreme
Court’s April 2013 decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,4 the
district court held that it lacked ATS jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’
claims. 5 The district court further held that Iraqi law governs
plaintiffs’ common law claims.6 Finally, the district court held that
plaintiffs’ failed to state a claim under Iraqi law, and as such,
plaintiffs’ common law claims against CACI PT were dismissed.7

* J.D., University of South Carolina School of Law, 2014. B.A. in
History and Political Science, Mount Holyoke College, 2009.
1
See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Va.
2013).
2
Id. at 858.
3
Id. at 859. Plaintiffs’ asserted “jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (ATS),
and 28 U.S.C. §1367 (supplemental jurisdiction).” Id. The plaintiffs’ third
amended complaint alleged twenty “causes of action including torture; civil
conspiracy to commit torture; aiding and abetting torture; cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment; and war crimes.” Id.
4
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
5
See Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 863–68.
6
See id. at 869–71.
7
See id. at 871–74.
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First, this comment will discuss the district court’s analysis and
holdings of the three major issues in this case. Second, it will argue
that the district court failed to properly analyze the Kiobel holding
causing it to wrongly deny its own jurisdictional powers over the
defendants and in doing so the district court expanded upon the initial
meaning of Kiobel. Third, it will analyze the use of the Ohio choice
of law provisions and the court’s improper analysis of Iraqi law.
Finally, this comment will discuss some of the potential ramifications
created by the decisions of the district court in Al Shimari.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc. is the culmination of a
series of transfers from numerous district courts, case consolidations,
and multiple decisions from the District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, which were the result of many pretrial motions,
including motions to dismiss various parties and claims.8 The case
had also has been before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on two
different occasions.9
On June 30, 2008, plaintiff Suhail Najim Abdullah Al Shimari,
an Iraqi citizen, filed the initial action against CACI International,
Inc. (CACI, Inc.),10 alleging he was physically and mentally abused
and tortured while he was interrogated as an enemy combatant by
CACI PT and the U.S. military at the Abu Ghraib military detention

8

See id. at 859; see also Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 2d
(E.D. Va. 2013); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d
700 (E.D. Va. 2009), rev’d, 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 679
F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) ; Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, 2008 WL 7348184
(E.D. Va. 2008), vacated, 933 F. Supp. 2d 793 (E.D. Va. 2013).
9
See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), rev’d
en banc, 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012).
10
Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 859. CACI International, Inc. is “a
Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, and CACI
PT its wholly-owned subsidiary and [is] also located in Arlington, Virginia.”
Id. “Both CACI PT and CACI, Inc. are corporations that contractually
provided interrogation services for the United States military at Abu Ghraib
during the period in question. Specifically, beginning in September 2003,
CACI PT provided civilian interrogators for the U.S. Army’s military
intelligence brigade assigned to the Abu Ghraib prison.” Id. (citations
omitted).
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centers (Abu Ghraib).11 These allegations included food deprivation,
forced nudity, beatings, electric shock, sensory deprivation, extreme
temperatures, death threats, oxygen deprivations, sexual assaults, and
mock executions. On September 18, 2008, plaintiffs Taha Yaseen
Arraq Rashid, Asa’ad Hamza Hanfoosh Al-Zuba’e, and Salah Hasan
Nsaif Jasim Al-Ejaili joined the action.12
On March 18, 2009, the district court denied one of the motions
to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claims, and rejected the argument that
CACI PT and CACI, Inc. were entitled to sovereign immunity or that
these claims were preempted. 13 However, the district court also
refused to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ ATS claims stating
that the tort claims were “too modern and too novel to satisfy the
Sosa [v. Alvarez-Machain] requirements for ATS jurisdiction.” 14
While use of the ATS has seen a dramatic increase in recent years,
the ATS was enacted as a part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.15 The
ATS allows “aliens” to bring tort claims in federal district courts for
violations “of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”16

11

Between September 22, 2003 and May 6, 2005, many Iraqi citizens
were interrogated and held at various military detention centers within a
complex located in Abu Ghraib, Iraq. Id. There have been wide spread
reports of abuse and torture that occurred during this period of time. Id.
12
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, 2008 WL 7348184 at *1 (E.D. Va. 2008).
13
See Al Shimari, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 731–32; see also Al Shimari, 951
F. Supp. 2d at 859.
14
Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 859; see Al Shimari, 657 F. Supp. 2d
at 731–32. The Fourth Circuit noted that Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692 (2004), dictates that federal courts should dismiss private claims “for
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar
when § 1350 [ATS] was enacted.” Al Shimari, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 727
(quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732). The Fourth Circuit also noted that federal
courts should be cautious “when recognizing additional torts under the
common law that enable ATS jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at
729).
15
See Teresa M. O’Toole, Comment, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
Argentine Republic: An Alien Tort Statute Exception to Foreign Sovereign
Immunity, 72 MINN. L. REV. 829, 837 n.49 (1988).
16
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
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However, the ambiguity of the ATS language forces many courts to
deny jurisdiction.17
The district court declined to address the question of whether
war crimes; torture; and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment are
sufficiently universal and obligatory international law norms that
meet the Sosa standard, instead reasoning that claims against
government contractors are a fairly modern construct and do not have
an adequate definition within the realm of international law.18
On September 21, 2011, in a divided panel, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court’s 2009 ruling, finding that acts which are
integrated into the activities of military combatants should be
immune from liability. 19 However, on May 11, 2012, sitting en
banc, 20 the Fourth Circuit vacated the panel decision, finding that
proper jurisdiction over CACI, Inc. and CACI PT had not been found
during the appeal.21 On May 31, 2012, CACI, Inc. and CACI PT
argued for a stay of the Fourth Circuit’s mandate arguing that they
were going to file a petition of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. 22 On June 1, 2012, the Fourth Circuit stayed its
mandate, yet issued its final mandate on June 29, 2012.23
While the case was still before the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia on remand, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
how the ATS should be applied to acts that occurred on foreign soil
in its decision of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.24 Due to the
Kiobel decision, the district court “stayed all pending motions as of
April 18, 2013 and ordered [briefings on two issues:] (1) the effect,
17

While the language of the ATS allows aliens to bring tort claims in
district courts, the remainder of the statutory language is so vague that
district courts frequently deny jurisdiction. O’Toole, supra note 15, at 839.
18
See Al Shimari, 657 F. Supp. 2d. at 727.
19
See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir. 2011),
rev’d en banc, 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012).
20
Upon losing an appeal, the losing side may request a rehearing in
front of the entire membership of the circuit that ruled on the case. In the
alternative, the losing side may request that a three-judge panel to reconsider
its decision. Fed. R. App. P. 35a–c.
21
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 224 (4th Cir. 2012).
22
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp.2d 857, 860 (E.D. Va.
2013)
23
Id.
24
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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if any, of Kiobel on Plaintiffs’ [ATS] claims . . . and (2) whether the
Court retains jurisdiction over Plaintiff Al Shimari’s common law
claims and the choice-of-law determination on those claims.”25
After the district court’s order, CACI PT filed a “Motion for
Reconsideration, or in the alternative Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
[ATS] Claims, and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended
Complaint for Failure to State a Claim.”26 Upon the filing of these
motions, the district court now had three issues pending before it: (1)
“whether the court ha[d] subject matter jurisdiction, by operation of
the ATS, over Plaintiffs’ claims of violations of international law
against CACI PT for torture, war crimes, and inhuman treatment
resulting from injuries occurring in Abu Ghraib”; (2) “whether the
Court [should] apply Ohio, Virginia, or Iraqi law to Plaintiff Al
Shimari’s common law claims where Al Shimari filed suit in Ohio
against a Virginia corporation for acts and injuries occurring in Iraq
during a multinational occupation of Iraq”; and (3) “whether the
Court should grant CACI PT’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state
a claim under Iraqi law where Al Shimari present[ed] various
common law claims for actions occurring in Iraq, . . . governed by
laws promulgated by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 27
during occupation by a multinational force.”28
25
26

2013).

Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp.2d at 861.
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l Inc., 951 F. Supp. 857, 857–58 (E.D. Va.

27
The Coalition Provisional Authority “governed Iraq between May
2003 and June 28, 2004 at which time the CPA ceded governance to the
Interim Government of Iraq.” Id. at 871 (citing United States ex rel. DRC,
Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 562 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 2009)). “During its
governance, the CPA issued a number of ‘orders’ setting forth the operative
legal framework of Iraq . . . .” Id. (citing Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724,
728 (4th Cir. 2010)).. Order Number 17, the order relevant here, states in
Section 3 that “‘[c]oalition contractors and their sub-contractors as well as
their employees . . . shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in
matters relating to the Coalition forces or the CPA.’” Id. (citation omitted)
The order further states in Section 6 that:
third party claims including those for . . . personal injury,
illness or death or in respect of any other matter arising
from or attributed to Coalition personnel or any persons
employed by them . . . that do not arise in connection
with military combat operations, shall be submitted and
dealt with by the Parent State whose Coalition personnel,
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II. ANALYSIS
A. REPORT
1. MOTION TO DISMISS ATS CLAIMS
On April 17, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Kiobel
case, which turned on the issue of whether and in what situations the
ATS allowed federal courts to retain jurisdiction over causes of
action pertaining to violations of international law which did not
occur inside the jurisdiction of the United States.29 “Kiobel involved
former Nigerian nationals, [currently] residing in the United States,
who filed suit under the ATS against Dutch, British, and Nigerian
corporations for [assisting] the Nigerian government” in violating
international law within Nigeria. 30 The Supreme Court in Kiobel
“rejected the extraterritorial application of the ATS” relying upon
“statutory construction, which states that absent Congress’s
indication otherwise, there [is a] presumption against extraterritorial
application of federal statutes.”31 The Supreme Court went further to
state that “the text of the ATS failed to rebut the presumption that the
statute would not be”32 applied extraterritorially and that “‘nothing in
the text of the [statute] suggest[ed] that Congress intended . . . [such]
extraterritorial reach.” 33 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that
because the alleged violations of customary international law
occurred exclusively outside United States territory, “federal courts
were not a proper forum for the plaintiffs’ claims absent . . . [any]
congressional intent for the ATS to apply to injuries which occurred
within . . . another sovereign.”34
The Eastern District of Virginia first looked at CACI PT’s
motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ ATS claims. The district court granted
defendant’s motion, holding that it lacked “subject matter jurisdiction
property, activities or other assets are alleged to have
caused the claimed damage, in a manner consistent with
the national laws of the Parent State.
Id. (citation omitted).
28
Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. at 858.
29
Id. at 864. (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659, 1663 (2013)).
30
Id. (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63).
31
Id. (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664).
32
Id. (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664).
33
Id. (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665).
34
Id. at 864–65 (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669).
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over Plaintiffs’ ATS claims because, as held in Kiobel,” the ATS
does not grant jurisdiction to tort claims where the alleged conduct
occurred entirely outside United States territory.35
The district court found that the ATS expands the jurisdiction of
the district courts by granting them jurisdiction over tort claims that
come from violations of international law, as opposed to creating a
new cause of action36 The district court reasoned that, by applying
Kiobel, it must dismiss the plaintiffs’ international law claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction since plaintiffs’ allegations dealt
with violations that occurred outside a U.S. territory.37
Additionally, concluding that the acts and injuries which gave
rise to the plaintiffs’ claims do not, and cannot, support ATS
jurisdiction, the district court refused to adopt the plaintiffs’
“argument that Iraq was not a territory external to the United States”
due to de facto sovereignty.38 The district court noted that “while
wartime occupation may show de jure sovereignty,” the military
force, which occupied Iraq during the time in question, was
comprised of more than just the United States military.39 Therefore,
the district court reasoned that the United States did not exclusively
control Iraq. 40 The district court also disagreed with the plaintiffs’

35
Id. at 863. The ATS was “enacted by the First Congress as a part of
the Judiciary Act of 1789” as a jurisdictional statute. Id. It provides that
“district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
36
Id. at 863 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714
(2004)).
37
Id. at 865.
38
Id. De facto sovereignty requires a judicial determination. Id. (citing
Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753–54 (2008)). “Plaintiffs’ rely on
Boumedine and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), [in which] the Supreme
Court held that . . . the United States maintained complete jurisdiction and
control over Guantanamo Bay, Cuba” as demonstrated by an express lease
agreement. Id. (citing Boumedine, 553 U.S. at 754; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480).
However, in the case before the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, there was no express agreement, only the CPA-promulgated
regulations to support the plaintiffs’ position. See id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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interpretation of Kiobel,41 stating that the Supreme Court was clear
“that the presumption against extraterritoriality is only rebuttable by
legislative act, and not by judicial decision.” 42 Specifically citing
four arguments from Kiobel, 43 the district court found that the
Supreme Court did not intend for there to be a rebuttable
presumption that could be altered by the facts and circumstances of
any one case. 44
The district court’s reasoning and reading of Kiobel also was
consistent with Morrison,45 the case Kiobel heavily relied upon. The
41

Plaintiffs’ argued that Kiobel should be interpreted to “hold that the
presumption against extraterritoriality” would be overcome if a sufficient
connection with the United States existed. Id. at 866. Plaintiffs’ further
argued that “Kiobel does not impose a ‘bright line test”’ or automatically bar
jurisdiction if the tort occurs in a foreign territory, but “allows for the facts of
the case to rebut the presumption” if there is a sufficient connection with the
United States. Id. In essence, plaintiffs interpreted Kiobel to allow for the
presumption against extraterritoriality to be overcome by judicial decision
and that the Supreme Court intended to leave the question “of what cases or
claims could displace the presumption” up to the judiciary. Id.
42
Id.
43
The district court found that its narrower reading of Kiobel was
supported by at least four specific reasons in the Supreme Court opinion.
First, the discussion in Kiobel stated that “‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,’” which could only
suggest “that the text of the statute itself” has to rebut the presumption. Id.
(quoting Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (citing Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010)). Next, Kiobel said “that ‘to
rebut the presumption, the ATS would need to evince a clear indication of
extraterritoriality,’” showing again that the statute must rebut the
presumption. Id. (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665). Third, the Supreme
Court stated that if Congress had intended for the ATS to have an
extraterritorial reach, then a more specific statute would be needed. See id.
Finally, the Supreme Court explained that the presumption assists in
maintaining the balance between the branches of government so that “‘the
Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries
foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.’”
Id. (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))).
44
See id. at 867.
45
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
Morrison revolved around the issue of “whether the Securities Exchange Act
. . . provided a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs for fraudulent securities
exchanges originating outside the United States.” Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp.
2d at 867 (citing Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875). In reviewing the lower
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district court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments46 on the grounds that
Morrison expressly rejected their view and that Kiobel did not place
any limitations on Morrison regarding Morrison’s disapproval of
judicial guesswork in the presumption’s applicability instead of
relying on the statutory construct.47 Instead, the district court read
the text of Kiobel to extend the presumption to the ATS,48 and denied
the plaintiffs’ ATS claims due to lack of jurisdiction.49
2. Motion to Dismiss Common Law Claims
Next, the district court looked at CACI PT’s motion to dismiss
Al Shimari’s common law claims and granted its motion because
Iraqi law precludes liability for the alleged actions.50 Holding to the
long-standing Erie Doctrine, 51 the district court found that the
courts decisions, the Supreme Court “invoked the presumption against
extraterritorial application of the Act,” finding that, unless Congress clearly
intended to give a statute extraterritorial effect, the Court must “‘presume
[the statute] is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.’” Id. (citing
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quoting EEOC, 499 U.S. at 248)). The
Morrison Court held that courts should “apply the presumption in all cases,
preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with
predictable effects.” Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881.
46
Plaintiffs argued that the district court should make a factual judicial
determination. Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 867. This argument was
similar to the “north star” approach taken by the Second Circuit, before it
was so firmly rejected by the Morrison Court. Id. This approach calls for a
judicial weighing of the “conduct” and “effects” (specifically in securities
cases) to see whether the presumption against extraterritoriality was
sufficiently rebutted. See id.; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879.
47
Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. at 867.
48
See id.
49
See id. at 868.
50
Id.
51
As set forth in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1983),
when a district court is sitting in diversity it must apply the substantive law
of the state in which the court sits. Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. at 868 (citing
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78). This includes the state’s choice of law rules. Id.
(citing Colgan Air, Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 507 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir.
2007) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97
(1941); Erie, 304 U.S. at 78)). The exception to the Erie doctrine arises
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which allows a district court to transfer a civil
action to another district, for the convenience of the parties, if the case could
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presumption of Ohio’s choice of law rule52 required the district court
to apply Iraqi law to Al Shimari’s common law claims.. The district
court then analyzed the claims to determine whether the claims had a
more significant relationship to another jurisdiction. The district
court found that the Morgan factors “fail[ed] to compel a departure
from the presumptive application of Iraqi law.”53 Therefore, because
have originally been brought in the transferee court or if all parties consent to
the transfer. See 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (2006). Under these circumstances, it
is only the location that is changed, not the laws that are being applied, and
the transferee court is required to apply the law of the original court. See
Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 510 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1987). Therefore,
based on the Erie Doctrine and § 1404(a) ,while this case is being heard in
the Eastern District of Virginia, the district court must apply both Ohio’s
substantive law and choice of law rule, since the case was transferred to the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia from the Southern District
of Ohio. Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. at 869.
52
The Ohio choice of law provision generally requires that in tort
actions the applicable law is that of the place of injury. See Morgan v. Biro
Mfg. Co., 474 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ohio 1984). This rebuttable presumption
can be set aside if the court finds that “another jurisdiction has a more
significant relationship to the lawsuit.” Id. at 289. In determining if another
jurisdiction’s relationship is more significant, the court is to consider the
following factors:
(1) the place of the injury; (2) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place
of business of the parties; (4) the place where the
relationship between the parties, if any, is located; and
(5) any factors under Section 6 [of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws] which the court may deem
relevant to the litigation.
Id. Morgan goes further in breaking down the fifth factor to include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant
policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue, (d) the protection of justified
expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination
and application of [the] law to be applied.
Id. n.6 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971)).
53
See supra, note 44; Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 870. In going
through the Morgan factors, the district court found that: (1) the injury
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the facts failed to rebut the choice of law presumption, the district
court is required to apply Iraqi law.
At the time of the alleged actions, the district court found that
Iraqi law precluded liability for the actions taken by CACI PT. 54
CACI PT argued that the Supreme Court defines the term “relating
to” broadly when used by Congress to preempt state legislation;
therefore, the district court should also interpret “relating to” broadly
in this case.55 The district court agreed with CACI PT’s argument,
and accordingly, CACI PT’s actions, and the alleged harms caused
by those actions, “relate to” CACI PT’s contract and were, therefore,
protected.56 As such, Al Shimari is prevented from pursuing claims
under Iraqi law due to Order Number 17 Section 3.
In the alternative, the district court found that Section 6 of Order
No. 17 also precludes Al Shimari’s common law claims. The district
court was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument, 57 but instead
reasoned that the “[t]he detention and interrogation of potential
enemy combatants or hostile individuals is most certainly connected
with contemporaneous military combat operations.” 58 The district
court further reasoned Section Six does not require a judicial
occurred in Iraq; (2) the conduct causing the injury also occurred in Iraq; (3)
“Al Shimari is an Iraqi citizen and CACI PT is a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in Virginia” supporting the conclusion that
there is not a more significant relationship by a place other than Iraq; (4) the
relationship of the parties also was located in Iraq; and (5) no other state has
a greater relationship to the claim than Iraq. Id.
54
See supra note 21. The governing CPA orders at the time in question
stated that contractors were to be granted immunity for actions related to the
terms of their contract. See Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 871. The law
also provided for an exception for personal injury liability where the injury
was the result of military combat operations and its related activities. Id.
55
Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 871–72 (citing Altria Grp., Inc. v.
Good, 555 U.S. 70, 85 (2008)).
56
The Supreme Court has interpreted “relating to” broadly where
Congress used the language in preempting state legislation. See Altria Grp.,
Inc., 555 U.S. at 85.
57
Plaintiff argued Section 6 requires the actions to involve military
combat operations and as the contract between CACI PT and the United
States military strictly prohibited CACI PT from participating in any combat
operations, CACI PT could not have participated in military combat
operations. Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 872.
58
Id.

212

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 10.1

determination of an exception to liability because “merely a
connection to combat activity is sufficient.” 59 Therefore, because
CACI PT’s activities were clearly connected to combat activity,
CACI PT cannot be held liable for its actions. For these reasons, the
district court granted CACI PT’s motion to dismiss Al Shimari’s
common law claims for failure to state a claim under Iraqi common
law.60
B. ANALYSIS
1. ATS Claims
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ultimately
found that the Kiobel decision precluded Al Shimari’s ATS claims
under the circumstances of the case. For its part, Kiobel pertained
entirely to extraterritorial acts where none of the parties were citizens
of the United States.61 This district court expands upon the holding
in Kiobel to now state that ATS jurisdiction does not extend to
violations of humanitarian law that were committed by American
governmental entities.62 Yet, given that the defendants in this case
were United States corporations with primary places of business
located in the United States, it would initially appear that the claims
of the plaintiffs “‘touch and concern the territory of the United States
. . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality.’” 63 However, Chief Justice Roberts clearly stated
in Kiobel that a “mere corporate presence” in the United States, when
the conduct occurred solely outside the United States territory, is not
enough to “touch and concern” the United States.64
The district court in this case refused to apply the “touch and
concern” language of the Kiobel court.65 As argued by the plaintiffs,
59

Id. at 872–73.
In coming to this decision, the district court made sure to note that its
decision did not arise from military immunity, but from the application of
Iraqi law that was applied due to the Ohio choice of law provisions. Id. at
873.
61
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
62
Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d 857.
63
See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, No. 12-CV30051-MAP,
2013 WL 4130756, at *15 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013) (quoting Kiobel, 133 S.
Ct. at 1669).
64
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
65
See Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. at 867–68.
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the Supreme Court did not create a bright line test in Kiobel; and
accordingly, the door was left open for district courts to interpret the
Kiobel decision and apply it appropriately to the factual situation
presented before them. 66 In a comparable case, Sexual Minorities
Uganda v. Lively,67 the District Court of Massachusetts held the ATS
still provides jurisdiction for actions, which occurred outside the
United States, when the actor is a United States citizen and much of
the planning of his actions occurred within the United States. 68
However, in Al Shimari, the district court failed to analyze whether
the connection to the United States went any further than the fact that
the companies were based outside of the United States and that the
contract in question was between the United States military and
United States corporations.
Following the theory of Sexual
Minorities Uganda, this alone might have been sufficient to show
that the defendants’ actions “touch[ed] and concern[ed] the territory
of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality,” thereby meeting the Kiobel
and Morrison test.69 Additionally, there is case law that the district
court failed to appropriately apply. Sexual Minorities Uganda, while
not precedent to Al Shimari, is helpful in illuminating the Supreme
Court’s previous interpretation of the jurisdictional reach of the ATS.
In order for a federal court to recognize a claim under the ATS, the
Supreme Court previously dictated that “a federal court can only
recognize a claim under the ATS if the claim seeks to enforce an
underlying norm of international law that is as clearly defined and
accepted as the international law norms familiar to Congress in 1789
when the ATS was enacted.”70
Had the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia had
Sexual Minorities Uganda as a reference while making its decision, it
should have followed the District of Massachusetts interpretation of
the ATS. The district court would therefore be required to first
determine if there is a violation of an international norm, and second
to determine if said norm is within the group of claims under ATS

66

See id. at 867.
See generally Sexual Minorities Uganda, 2013 WL 4130756.
68
Sexual Minorities Uganda, 2013 WL 4130756, at *15.
69
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1699.
70
Sexual Minorities Uganda, 2013 WL 4130756, at *7 (citing Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
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jurisdiction. 71 Applying this theory to the facts of Al Shimari, the
plaintiffs alleged violations of their human rights, including torture,
which have clearly been prohibited in many international treaties and
international courts have found are crimes against humanity. 72
Therefore, the district court must derive whether torture was
prohibited by international law norms in 1789, the year the ATS was
enacted.
Prohibitions of torture have been recognized since before the
mid-1900’s. 73 Treaties, judicial decisions, and legislative or
executive decisions may determine international law.74 Additionally,
the Supreme Court has found that if these controlling documents are
absent, then the existence of international law and its contents may
be drawn from:
“[T]he customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators,
who by years of labor, research and experience, have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of
which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial
tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is.”75
Even a cursory overview of international treaties shows that “no
physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any
kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be
71

See id.
See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, US Treaty Doc. 110-20,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 136; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 255 (June 27); Prosecutor v.
Du[ko Tadi] a/k/a/ “Dule,” Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence
Motion on Jurisdiction, 65–74 (Aug. 10, 1995).
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See supra note 72.
74
See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (quoting Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
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threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.”76 Therefore, the plaintiffs’ cause of action
should have been found appropriate under the ATS as the plaintiffs
were being held as prisoners of war at Abu Ghraib.
2. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
In deciding Al-Shimari’s common law claims, the district court
properly followed Ohio’s choice of law rule pursuant to the Erie
doctrine. The Erie doctrine, along with the exception for transfers
pursuant to § 1404(a), is well-settled law that applies to substantive
law claims, which include choice of law rules.77 Ohio’s choice of
law provisions provide a rebuttable presumption that the governing
law is law of the state where the injury occurred.78
Arguably, the district court properly weighed the Restatement
factors to determine if the presumption was rebutted. First, the
defendants are United States corporations. Therefore, the plaintiff is
not requesting that the district court apply foreign law to the
defendants, but simply apply the law of the defendants’ home
country. Second, Iraqi law does not provide a remedy for the
conduct because it protects contractors from being charged.
Therefore, the plaintiff has no forum for this claim in Iraq.
The district court also pushed aside the plaintiff’s categorization
of the defendants’ actions, stating that the defendants’ fell under a
grant of immunity in the military combat provision of Section 6.79
However, as Al Shimari pointed out, the defendants’ contract with
the United States strictly prohibited the defendants from participating
in any form of military activity.80 Therefore, the defendants’ contract
with the United States was invalidated by their military combat

76

David Weissbrodt & Cheryl Heilman, Defining Torture and Cruel,
Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 29 LAW & INEQ. 343, 349 (2011)
(quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
supra note 72).
77
See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, No. 12-CV30051-MAP,
2013 WL 4130756, at *22 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013).
78
See Byers v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 607 F. Supp. 2d 840, 846–47 (N.D.
Ohio 2009).
79
See supra note 52.
80
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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actions and; therefore, the CDCI PT and CDCI, Inc. would not be
covered by the protections of Iraqi common law.
C. PRACTICAL IMPACT
Al Shimari is one of the first cases to be decided after the
landmark decision made in Kiobel. While it may not be a landmark
case in its own right, it is the beginning of a new era in which, under
the ATS some district courts may believe they do not hold
jurisdiction over claims arising from actions committed outside the
United States.
The district court in this case has restricted the jurisdiction of
district courts even further than Kiobel did by failing to properly
apply the “touch and concern” test from Kiobel. This means that
many cases that potentially fall under the jurisdiction of district
courts will be dismissed because courts will fail to see the error of
this analysis.
As can be seen, is it possible for the ATS to still provide
jurisdiction for cases outside the United States territory, however,
some courts will read Al Shimari’s expansion of Kiobel to restrict
jurisdiction to deny coverage to crimes committed by citizens of the
United States outside of the territory of the United States. In some
circumstances, the victims will not be able to find a venue to air their
grievances due to this narrowing of the jurisdiction of district courts.

CONCLUSION
Al-Shimari and his fellow plaintiffs claim they were brutally and
inhumanely treated at the hands of CDCI PT and CDCI, Inc. The
case presented before the district court ask: (1) whether the court has
subject matter jurisdiction, by operation of the ATS, over the
plaintiffs’ claims of violations of international law against CACI PT
for torture, war crimes, and inhuman treatment resulting from injuries
occurring in Abu Ghraib; (2) whether the district court should apply
Ohio, Virginia, or Iraqi law to plaintiff Al Shimari’s common law
claims where Al Shimari filed suit in Ohio against a Virginia
corporation for acts and injuries occurring in Iraq during a
multinational occupation of Iraq; and (3) whether the district court
should grant CACI PT’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Iraqi law where Al Shimari presents various common law
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claims for actions occurring in Iraq, which was governed by laws
promulgated by the CPA during occupation by a multinational force?
The district court found it did not have jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs’ ATS claims pursuant to the recent holding in Kiobel,
which denied the district court’s jurisdiction over claims for actions
occurring outside the United States except in specific circumstances.
The district court then found that, by applying Ohio’s choice of law
provision, Al Shimari’s common law claims had to be dismissed
because Iraqi law at the time the alleged offenses were committed
provided a grant of immunity for the defendants.
The district court, however, failed to properly analyze the facts
of the Al Shimari case by refusing to apply the “touch and concern”
test, as provided in Kiobel. Due to the lack of specificity provided by
the Supreme Court in the Kiobel case, the district court did not know
how to apply the test, so they failed to do so entirely.
The district court similarly failed to review additional precedent,
which grants district courts jurisdiction over ATS claims for
violations of international norms.
By failing to review the
international norms and customs regarding torture and prisoners of
war, the district court declined on jurisdiction when it was not
required to.
Finally, the district court took the Iraqi common law at face
value, instead of reviewing the facts to determine if the Iraqi law
actually protected the defendants. The district court granted the
defendants immunity pursuant to Iraqi common law; however, by
acting outside the scope of their contract, the defendants might not
have been eligible for this protection.
By expanding the holding of the Kiobel case to include actions
committed by United States corporations outside the territory of the
United States, the district court precludes many victims from an
avenue of redress, which may have been their only opportunity for
justice. The district court similarly created a loophole for United
States corporations to get away with horrible crimes against
humanity.

